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INTRODUCTION
Like about 1,000 other people, Sandra was disappointed on
April 1st to find a rejection slip in her mail from a Northeastern
graduate program in clinical psychology, which we will call Dudley
University. It was a bit of a blow, since both her interviewers
had been visibly impressed with her "perfect record," and she had
expressed a strong interest in Dudley. What was more painful,
however, was the reason for her rejection, told to a friend of hers
by a professor on the admissions committee: "We felt that someone
of her religious orientation would not feel comfortable in the
program.
"
Sandra was a born-again Christian, but her psychological orien-
tation was psychoanalytic, as was Dudley's. She was not interested
in integrating her faith with her practice of clinical psychology,
nor were her research interests anything but secular. In fact,
her research fit quite well into that of several faculty members.
In short, there was at least no visible way in which it could be
said that her faith would interfere with her functioning like any
other student. It seems that membership in this particular reli-
gious group was in itself sufficient grounds for rejection.
Sandra got into another school she actually liked better and
thus dropped her plans for a possible lawsuit. That happy ending
is only partially comforting, however, for her case raises a dis-
turbing question. Was this an isolated incident, or is such reli-
gious discrimination a systematic and widespread practice in
clinical psychology admissions? The purpose of this study will b,
to answer that question.
CHAPTER I
LITERATURE REVIEW
Paul Clement, Professor of Psychology at Fuller Theological
Seminary reports a similar incident on a larger scale. He claimed
in an article in the APA Monitor (1978) that the entire graduate
school of psychology at Fuller Seminary was discriminated against
by the A. P. A. in its bid for accreditation (which it eventually
received) because of its religious orientation.
At least one psychologist, Paul Vitz of New York University,
would not be surprised to discover that this problem may be per-
vasive. He has written (1977), "It is difficult to document such
a thing as the general attitude of a profession, but the hostility
of most psychologists to Christianity is very real (pg. 12)."
Subsequently, he has extended this observation to include not only
Christianity but all forms of traditional religion (personal com-
munication)
.
One of Vitz's graduate students (Nix, 1978) has tried to
document his pervasive feeling in an excellent study of the reli-
gious values of clinical psychologists. From a large number of
questions answered by 240 randomly selected clinical psychologists,
a few basic trends become clear. While only 13% of the subjects
identify themselves as "anti-religious," responses to other
questions suggest that the number may be between 25%-45%, depending
on how strictly you define the term.
Just over 25% seem to feel that religion in any form is undesir-
able. For example, 26% believe that "religion is a set of illusions
that will hopefully be vanquished by science and education."
Twenty-eight percent agreed that, "belief in a supernatural being
is a sign of a person's failure to accept responsibility for his
own life."
An additional 15%-20% are not against religion in principle,
but believe that "most of the time" it has a negative effect when
practiced, at least in its present form. Forty percent said that,
" in general
,
most people's religiosity is more harmful than help-
ful." Forty-seven percent agreed that, " In general
,
religion
fosters passivity and unhealthy dependency which prevents people
from taking an active part in planning and improving their lives."
In contrast, only 10% describe themselves as "very religious,"
and only a fraction of these are likely to be religious in any
traditional sense. Two and a half percent believe in the tradi-
tional concept of an afterlife, for example. Not all Orthodox
Jews hold the concept of afterlife, but they constitute only
another 1.3% of the sample. Thus, it is safe to say that less
than 5% of the sample is traditionally religious.
This trend cannot merely be attributed to a general decline
of religiosity in the nation as a whole:
Compared to the figures from the most recent National
Gallup Poll (May, 1976) this therapist population is
very different from and less religious than the
general public. The Gallup group was 61% Protestant,
27% Catholic, 2% Jewish and 4% agnostic-atheist as
compared to this sample's frequencies of 16.5%, 8.9%,
520.3% and 27%. Regarding the importance of religiousbeliefs in the lives of Gallup subjects, 66% felt
they were very important, 25% fairly important, and
5% not too important. For this therapist population
(in response to a comparable question) 16.8% felt
that their religious beliefs (pro or con) were a very
important part of their life philosophy; 16% felt
that they were moderately important; 14% only slightly
important. Seventy three percent of the Gallup Poll
believed in life after death (of any kind) compared
to 30% of the therapists.
(Nix, 1978, pg. 182)
Thus, Nix's results seem to at least suggest that Sandra's
experience of anti-religious sentiment in clinical psychology was
not unusual. A deeper insight into the meaning of these feelings
can best be found in the writings of psychologists themselves. In
the next three sections I will explore the attitudes and assumptions
concerning religion of three major schools of clinical psychology:
Psychoanalysis, Behaviorism, and Humanistic Psychology. All of
these schools have anti-religious assumptions as a basic part of
their theoretical world-view.
Psychoanalys is
Freud .
One well-known adage has it that the four people who have
most profoundly influenced modern thought are Freud, Marx, Darwin
and Jesus. Three of those four have, among their other contribu-
tions, presented some of the most powerful arguments for atheism
ever known. Freud argued that religion is a wish fulfilling
illusion based on the infantile needs of the believer.
Freud cannot take full credit for developing the theory of
6religion as wish fulfillment, however. Consider the following
quote by Feuerbach (1843), whom we have good reason to believe
Freud read:
The triune God springs out of a feeling of want.
What man misses - whether this be articulate and
therefore conscious, or an unconscious need - that ishis God. The disconsolate feeling of emptiness and
loneliness demands a God in whom there is fellowship,
a union of beings fervently in love with each other.'
(Pg. 97)
Nonetheless, Freud expanded these ideas, popularized them and
put them in a larger more systematic theoretical framework.
Freud wrote four major works and more than a dozen papers
dealing with the subject of religion. A few basic themes will be
discussed here as they developed in their writings.
Freud proposed in Totem and Taboo (1913) that society began
as a group of primitive hordes dominated by one male. That man
had sex with all of the women in the clan, but none of the other
men were allowed to. When the sons were strong enough, they would
murder the father, and take women for themselves. As foreign as
this concept may sound to some, it was in keeping with the pre-
vailing anthropological speculations of Freud's day. In fact, the
central concept comes from Darwin himself.
Darwin deduced from the habits of higher apes that
men too originally lived in comparatively small groups
or hordes within which jealousy of the oldest and
strongest male prevented sexual promiscuity (.. .the
most probable view is that primeval man aboriginally
lived in small communities, each with as many wives
as he could support and obtain, whom he would have
jealously guarded against other men... when the young
male grows up, a contest takes place for mastery, and
the strongest, by killing and driving out the others,
7establishes himself as head of the community)
(Savage, 1885, pg. 125-126)
Eventually, according to Freud, the sons would prevail and
kill the father, resulting in an overwhelming sense of remorse and
guilt. For while envying and hating the father, they loved him as
well. This intense ambivalence is the core of all religious senti-
ment. Religious ritual is a form of obsessional neurosis in which
the murder of the father is simultaneously or sequentially done
and undone unendingly.
In primitive religion, the dead father is brought back in the
form of the totem, an animal believed by the tribe to be their
patron and to possess supernatural powers. Thus, in a subliminated
form, the power and the life of the father is maintained. His
authority over the women is maintained as well, inasmuch as sex
with members of one's own tribe is forbidden:
The most ancient and important porhibitions are
the two basic laws of Totemism: not to kill the
totem animal and to avoid sexual intercourse with
members of the totem clan of the opposite sex.
(Freud, 1913, pg. 32)
These dynamics provide the basis for the church. As explicated
by Freud in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921),
Christ, like one of the ancient sons, replaces the primitive father
and at the same time, he is a "better father 11 in that he loves all
the sons, rather than persecutes them:
In the Church... as well as in the army, however
different the two may be in some respects, the
same illusion holds good of there being a head...
who loves all the individuals in the group with
an equal love . Everything depends upon this
8illusion... Christ stands to the individual members
or the group of believers in the relation of akind of elder brother; he is their substitute
father.
(p. 93-94)
But this is simply an idealistic remodelling of
the state of affairs in the primal horde, where
all of the sons knew that they were equally
persecuted by the primal father, and feared him
equally.
(p. 124-125)
In The Future of an Illusion (1927), Freud focuses more on
the positive half of the ambivalence toward the father. Providence
or God is an image of the father who first protected us from the
dangers of nature. Our desire to believe in Him is an expression
of our fear in the face of an overwhelming and hostile Universe,
and our need to know we have a benevolent protector:
Religious needs have arisen from the same need as
have all other achievements in civilization:
fr om the necessity of defending oneself aga ins
t
the crushingly superior forces of nature.
(pg. 21)
Religious ideas and doctrines are "illusion, fulfilling the oldest,
strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind" (pg. 30).
In Civilization and Its Discontents (1929) Freud takes a some-
what Marxian turn, describing religion as a tool of society. It
helps accomplish the subliraination of instinctual energy necessary
for life in a civilized society. He also integrates his religious
theories with his newly formed structural theory first presented 6
years before in The Ego and the Id (1923). He is now able to locate
in the super-ego the Oedipal guilt which he had previously been
saying was the basis of religion.
9In Moses and Monotheism (1939), Freud's last major work on
religion, Oedipal themes developed earlier are more systematically
applied to Judaism and Christianity. Freud adopts the hypothesis
of Biblical historian Ernst Sellin, that the Hebrews killed Moses
during a rebellion at Kadesh, prior to entrance into the promised
land. The parallel between this incident, the murder of the pri-
meval father, and the supposed patricidal impulses within us all
is apparent. The Jewish religion becomes a reparation for this
act, adn the "abiding sense of guilt" which accompanies it.
This sense of guilt, which was uninterruptedly
kept awake by the Prophets, and which soon formed
an essential part of the religious system.
. .And
driven by the need to satisfy this sense of
guilt... they must make those commandments grow
ever stricter, more meticulous and even more
trivial. In a fresh rapture of moral asceticism
they imposed more and more new instinctual
renunciations on themselves and in that way
reached—in doctrine and precept, at least
—
ethical heights which had remained inaccessible
to the other people of antiquity.
(p. 134)
Christianity, according to Freud, represents a more advanced
solution to the psychic problems tackled in Judaism. Actually, it
is the culmination of the process of religious evolution which
began with the totem.
St. Paul develops more fully the "sense of guilt" present in
Judaism and all religions with the doctrine of "original sin." He
perceives that obedience to the law is not sufficient to absolve
humanity of this guilt. The Sons have killed the primeval father,
Moses, and in their hearts their own individual biological fathers.
Finally, in Christianity a punishment which fits the crime is
chosen. A Son, Jesus Christ, is sacrificed to atone for the
murder of the primeval father. Through his death, his followers,
significantly called "brothers," are reconciled to the Divine
Father. Finally, Jesus, like the totem animal, is eaten in a fest
cal led Communion
.
Freud goes on, however, to show that the core of ambivalence
between father and son is still contained in Christianity. While
the death of the Son, Jesus, atones for the brothers 1 rebellion,
it also perpetuates it. He has himself become God, and replaces
the Father, according to Freud, as the center of worship:
It T s main doctrine, to be sure was the recon-
ciliation with God the Father, the expiation of
the Crime committed against Him; but the other
side of the relationship manifested in the Son,
who had taken the guilt on his shoulders,
becoming God himself beside the Father, and in
truth in place of the Father. Originally, a
Father religion, Christianity becomes a Son
religion, the fate of having to displace the
Father it could not escape.
(pg. 175)
In summary, religion is seen as an illusion, in fact an
obsessional neurosis, giving expression to the infantile helpless-
ness and fierce ambivalence of a son f s relationship to his father.
It is both a comforting fantasy of protection from and eternal
intimacy with a lost love object, and an expiation for the guilt
connected with hating and murdering him. More basically, however,
two things are clear. According to Freud the premises of religion
are false:
We can only regret that certain experiences inlife and observations in the world make it
impossible for us to accept the premise of such aSupreme Being,
Freud, 1939, p. 123)
And, like a symptom, it is an unfortunate choice of solutions to
man's existential dilemma:
The whole thing (religion) is so patently infan-
tile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with
a friendly attitude to humanity it is painful to
think that the great majority of mortals will
never be able to rise above this view
(Freud, 1929, p. 74)
Psychoanalysis after Freud ,
We are fortunate in possessing a string of 13 review articles
on psychoanalytic theories of religion which cover practically
every year from the time of Freud's writing to 1976. Though any
one article could be biased, all 13 put together suggest undeniably
that the reductionistic
,
anti-religious perspective in psycho-
analysis has endured and remained the dominant one in the field.
The first (Hopkins, 1937), begins by reviewing Freud f s own
work, which was contemporary at the time. Work by members of
Freud's inner circle, including Theodor Reik and Ernest Jones are
reviewed, as well as others working within the Freudian model. As
might be expected, in the excitement of Freud's actual presence,
there was little dissent about his basic propositions concerning
religion among those claiming to be psychoanalytic in their
orientation. Jung, of course, would eventually formulate his own
ideas concerning religion. However, that would be after his
12
departure from the the psychoanalytic camp, and his work is not
mentioned here. Jones, (1910) for example, states that "religion,
especially Christianity, is regarded as essentially an attempt to
solve the problems raised by man's aggressiveness, particularly by
the Oedipus complex (From Hopkins, 1937, pg. 31)."
Hopkins (1937) seems at a loss to find anything that the
analysts have to say about religion which is positive except:
Several of the psychoanalysts are not unfriendly
to religion as an influence with sublimatory,
stabilizing or palliative possibilities for the
neurotic, or transforming his individual illness
into a more collective social type.
(Pg- 30)
The only exception to this trend is Oskar Pfister, a Swiss
minister who was involved with Freud and his thought. An enigmatic
exception to the rule, he is frequently mentioned in discussions
of psychoanalysis and religion:
I know of only one who is a professing religionist;
I here refer to the Swiss Pfarrer Oskar Pfister.
(pg. 30)
Seward Hiltner's 1947 review article is written from the per-
spective of a psychologically-oriented religionist and professor
of theology, attempting to understand what positive contributions
psychoanalysis might have to make toward an understanding of
religion. Thus, he clearly tries to avoid its blatant condemnation
of religion. Nonetheless, he cannot ignore the clearly reduction-
istic trend in psychoanalysis. The works reviewed clearly "share
Freud's enthusiasm... that psychoanalysis can lay bare the infantile
roots of religious belief and practice. (Saffady, 1976, pg. 291)."
13
In Hiltner's article we also see the existence of a small
religious counter-trend, however. He cites a small number of
authors who have attempted to integrate faith with psychoanalytic
thought, but almost none of them are psychiatrists or psychologists
or have published in psychological journals or presses. They are
clergymen and professors of theology, counselling congregation
members and publishing in religious journals. These men were the
pioneers of what was becoming pastoral conselling. Seward Hiltner
himself would later found the first journal devoted to the topic.
While this young movement would gain strength, it would remain
distinct from and have little influence on the mainstream of
psychoanalytic thought concerning religion.
From 1950 to 1959 (Almansi, 1953, 1954, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959;
Arlow, 1951; Tarachow, 1950, 1952) we have review articles for each
year in the now defunct Annual Review of Psychoanalysis
. Two general
themes appear in these nine articles. First, there is a continued
reapplication and refinement of the Oedipal themes introduced by
Freud; we are once again told that:
The oedipal father of the individual emerges in
the religion of the masses as the Father God
(Tarachow, 1950, pg. 312 reviewing Brenner, 1950.
)
and
,
. . .religion was born of the need to make toler-
able for man a sense of infantile helplessness
and invoke the omnipotence of the God-father
figure in protecting him from the menacing forces
of nature.
(Arlow, 1951, pg. 538 reviewing Bunker, 1951.)
It seems that this line of thought had been somewhat exhausted,
however. There was a limit to the number of articles which could
debate the fine points and find yet more examples of Oedipal themes
in religion.
...by the 1980's, as the Annual Survey indicates,
the psychoanalytic study of relgion was in
trouble.
(Saffady, 1976, pg. 291)
The study of religion began to revive when new theoretical
innovations in represents the second theme in the literature. The
most important of these innovations for the study of religion was
the renewed interest in pre-Oedipal experiences with the mother.
For the purpose of our discussion, a more basic trend is clear.
All of the work reviewed in the Annual Survey preserves unambig-
uously as a fundamental tenet Freud's belief that all religious
doctrine and practice is an attempt to gratify primitive uncon-
scious instincts through the use of illusion. In addition, there
is no mention of those works attempting to integrate religious
concepts with psychoanalysis, despite the Annual Review's pledge
to "present an objective account of the current literature, with
critical selection or evaluation kept to a minimum (Frosch, 1951,
pg. xiii)."
The final review article by William Saffady (1976), intention-
ally begins covering the literature at the year the Annual Review
stopped publishing, 1960, and covers it until 1976. He notes
three currents in the field. In addition to the increase in the
15
attention paid to pre-Oedipal themes concerning the mother pre-
viously mentioned, the concepts of ego psychology were finally
being applied to the study of religion. Second, he notes an
increased attempt to integrate anthropological and historical
research and psychoanalytic theory.
The third trend, by far the most interesting for the purposes
of this study, is the attempt of a few psychoanalytic theologians
and even secular psychoanalysts (Dalmau, 1967; Guntrip, 1969; Kaplan,
1963; LaBarre, 1970) to suggest that there is such a thing as
"healthy religiosity," which can be distinguished from obsessional
or other types of neurotic religiosity. Unlike their counterparts
from the 1930' s and 40 's, the ideas of these men were thankfully
able to find their ways into respected psychological journals.
The existence of this third current may suggest that, at last,
at least some psychoanalysts are beginning to become more tolerant
in their view of religion. However, according to William Saffady
(1971) that group is still the minority:
. . .Freud, while recognizing the therapeutic
potential in religious sublimations, insisted
that religion represents little more than a
neurotic attempt to avoid frightening reality.
This remains the accepted psychoanalytic view.
(pg. 296)
Behaviourism
A few men, however, began to argue for the
separation of the study of nature from metaphysical
preoccupations. They saw no need to search for
final causes and felt that empirical observation
and mathematical measurement were all that was
16
necessary in scientific investigation
(Blum, Cameron & Barnes, 1966).
The above words could easily have been written about John
Watson and the behaviorist school of psychology. m fact, they
concern the 17th century scientists who first introduced the
"scientific method." Like Watson, they refused to be influenced
either by the tenets of religion or the prevailing philosophy of
their day (Platonism and Aristo tleanism)
.
The 17th century scientists were still, nonetheless, a part
of their religious culture. Descarte, for example, considered to
be one of the prophets of the scientific method, claimed to have
proven God f s existence. As time progressed, however, the scien-
tists of the 17th century became the "religious skeptics" of the
18th, and the "atheistic materialists" of the 19th and 20th. It
is at this later and most vehemently anti-religious point in the
history of scientific thought that psychology joined the scientific
revolution.
In 18 79, William Wundt established the first scientific lab-
oratory for the study of psychology. In the 1910 f s, John Watson
began writing on behaviorism. Like many of the scientists of his
day, he had no affectionate feelings for religion:
The great mass of people even today have not yet
progressed very far from savagery - it wants to
believe in magic. Moses had his magic. He smote
the rock and water gushed. Christ had his magic.
He turned water into wine and raised the dead to
life... Magic lives forever. As time goes on,
the critically undigested, innumerably told tales
get woven into the folklore of the people. Folk-
lore in turn gets organized into religions... The
extent to which most of us are shot through with
a savage background is almost unbelievable. Few
of us escape. Not even a college education seems
to correct it. If anything it seems to strengthen
it, since colleges themselves are filled with
instructors who have the same background. Some
of our greatest biologists, physicists and
chemists, when outside their laboratories, fall
back upon folklore which has become crystallized
into religious concepts. These concepts - the
heritage of a timid savage past - have made the
emergence and growth of a scientific psychology
extremely difficult
(Watson, 1924, pg. 2-3)
In the next few pages we will examine more specifically the
points of contention between religion and behaviorism. By looking
at the words of both Watson (1924) and today's primary proponent
of behaviorism, B. F. Skinner, (1971) we shall see that the basic
battle lines between these two worldviews have not changed much in
50 years.
Particularly vexing to behaviorists is the religious idea of
a soul. Perhaps this is partially because they see this notion as
having infected the other schools of psychology. Watson writes:
Psychology and philosophy however in dealing with
non-material objects, as they thought, have found
it difficult to escape the language of the Church,
and hence the concept of a mind or soul as distinct
from the body comes down almost unchanged in
essence to the latter part of the 19th century.
(Pg. 3)
Skinner has created contemporary controversy by making essen-
tially the same point:
What is being abolished is the autonomous man,
the inner man, the possessing demon, the man
defended by the literature of freedom and dignity.
(pg. 200-201)
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Behaviorism and religion have other disagreements concerning
the nature of man. Behaviourism insists that man is merely a
complex animal. Religion insists that he is much more. He is
made in the image of God and has free will. Watson asserts the
behaviorist view:
We believed then, as we do now, that man is an
animal, different from the other animals only in
the type of behavior he displays .. .Human beings
do not want to class themselves with other animals.
They are willing to admit that they are animals,
but 'something else in addition. f It is this
1 something else 1 that causes the trouble. In this
'something else 1 is bound up everything that is
classed as religion, the life hereafter, morals,
love of children, parents, country and the like.
(Pg. ix)
In contrast to Hamlet's exclamation concerning man's nature
("How like a god..."), Skinner writes:
Pavlov, the behavioural scientist emphasized 'how
like a dog,' but that was a step forward.
. .Man is
a machine in the sense that he is a complex system
behaving in lawful ways.
(pg. 201-202)
Inasmuch as behaviorists view man as an animal without free
will, they view destructive or anti-social behaviour as the product
of poor training, not willful malevolance. Thus, the concept of
punishment, which requires the assumption of volition to make sense,
is condemned. In addition, Skinner cites evidence which suggests
that punishment is not as effective a teaching tool as positive
reinforcement. Naturally, both men view religion, with its emphasis
on moral accountability and punishment for sin, as a prime perpe-
trator of the punishment ethic:
Even our modern views of punishment of criminals
and children have their basis in the old religious
masochistic practices of the Church. Punishmentm the Biblical sense of an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth still honeycomb our entire
social and religious life.
(Watson, pg. 183)
Aversive control is no doubt sanctioned because
it is compatible with prevailing philosophies of
government and religion.
(Skinner, pg. 102.)
Like most schools of psychology, behaviourism comes into
conflict with religion over its moral code. Neither Watson nor
Skinner see the religious moral framework as useless. On the
contrary, they both view it as a valuable stabilizing force within
society, and an important component in its development. They do,
however, believe that it is too rigid, and that it can be replaced
by something better, namely a set of "new experimental ethics," as
Watson calls them, based on behavioristic principles.
Skinner goes a step farther than Watson in explaining what
the criteria for determining these new ethics should be. Those
behaviours which are most effective in fostering the survival of
the culture and its members are "right":
A culture which induces its members to work for
survival, or for the survival of some of its
practices is more likely to survive. Survival is
the only value according to which a culture is
eventually to be judged...
(pg. 136)
Watson envisions a brave new world built on behavioristic principle
For the Universe will change if you bring up your
children, not in the freedom of a libertine, but
in behaviouristic freedom. .
.
(pg. 303-304)
20
As the reader may have guessed, an essential part of this
miraculous transformation is the elimination of religion. This,
of course, is the central point of this chapter:
I wish I could picture for you what a rich and
wonderful individual we should make of every
healthy child, if only we could let it shape
itself properly and then provide for it a
Universe in which it could exercise that organ-
ization - a Universe unshackled by legendary folk-
lore of happenings thousands of years ago.
(pg. 304)
Skinner has also outlined his version of Utopia in Walden II
(1948) and Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971). He too, advocates
an elimination of extraneous past tradition:
A complete break with the past is impossible.
The designer of a new culture will always be
culture bound.
. .Within these practical limits,
however, it should be possible to minimize the
accidental features of prevailing cultures and to
turn to the sources of the things people call good.
(Skinner, 1971, pg. 164)
Is religion one of the "accidental features?" From Skinner's
comments in a 1967 Psychology Today interview we can assume that
it is:
And I don't know whether I want to improve
religion or not, I prefer to get rid of it...
(Hall, 1967, pg. 105).
Humanistic Psychology
In sharp contrast to either the psychoanalytic or behavioral
perspectives on religion stands the humanistic perspective. Most
importantly, it rejects the reductionistic materialism of both,
asserting that at least some forms of religion are valid and worth-
while. As Rollo May (1969) has said:
21
Freud was in error when he held that religion per
se is a compulsive neurosis. Some religion is
and some is not.
(pg. 193)
At first this seems like a welcome relief to the traditional
religionist. Yet, concomitant with their affirmation of "religion"
is a condemnation of most traditional religions, including and
especially Judaism and Christianity. The humanistic psychologists
are happy to rescue the word "religion," but they hope to provide
their own definition of what it should mean, a definition quite
different from the traditional one. Maslow (1964) states it thus:
One could say that the nineteenth century atheist
burnt down the house instead of remodelling it.
He had thrown out the religious questions with
the religious answers because he had to reject
the religious answers. That is, he turned his
back on the whole religious enterprise because
organized religion presented him with a set of
answers which he could not intellectually accept -
which rested on no evidence which a self-respecting
scientist could swallow. But what the more
sophisticated scientist is now in the process of
learning is that though he must disagree with
most of the answers to the religious questions
which have been given by organized religion...
The churches were trying to answer perfectly
sound human questions. Though the answers were
not acceptable, the questions themselves were and
are perfectly acceptable and perfectly legitimate.
(pg. 18)
To fully understand the humanistic "answers," one must go back
to the origins of the movement. If behaviourism has its roots in
the scientific revolution of the 17th century, humanistic psychology
has its in the Italian Renaissance of the 15th century, where the
term "humanism" was first coined. Indeed, a description of the
early humanists 1 views by historians Blum, Cameron and Barnes,
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sounds as if it could be taken from the writings of Maslow or Fromm:
Above all it encouraged them to believe that manis the master of his own destiny, that there needby no limit to his ambitions and virtuosity, and
that his purpose on earth is to develop himself
to his fullest capacities.
(Blum, Cameron and Barnes, 1966, pg. 72)
As the scientific revolution seemed to be in conflict with
religion even at its inception, so did the humanist movement. Like
the early scientists, most were still officially members of the
Church. However, they seemed to be more enthusiastic over the power
and talent of man, and less concerned with God and salvation than
the Church would have liked. In many ways, the differences between
modern humanistic psychology and traditional religion boil down to
the same issues in simply a more extreme form.
For Christianity, the belief that man is inherently sinful,
("original sin") is a fundamental tenet of the Biblical and historic
faith. As Paul Ramsey (1950) has said in his Basic Christian
Ethics :
The first assertion Christian ethics makes about
man is that he was created or personal existence
within the image of God, and that Jesus Christ
most perfectly reveals this image. The seocnd
assertion is that man is sinful. So fundamental
is this doctrine in Christian thought that it
cannot be overlooked. Indeed, many theologians
regard it as basic, equally with the first for
any full understanding of man in the light of God.
(p. 284)
Equally basic to the humanistic worldview, however, is the
belief that man is not inherently sinful, but basically good. Thus,
there is an irreconcilable conflict between these two systems of
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thought at the most basic level, their views on the nature of man.
Erich Fromm (1947) recognizes the fundamental nature of this dis-
agreement :
The position taken by humanistic ethics that man
is able to know what is good and do it on the
strength of his natural potentialities and reason
would be untenable if the dogma of man's innate
natural evilness were true.
(Pg. 212)
From humanistic psychology's premise that man is basically
good follow a host of propositions which bring it in conflict with
the most basic ideas of both traditional Judaism and Christianity.
According to both religions, God, not man, is the source of all
goodness in the Universe, whatever goodness man is naturally
capable of comes from his being created in God's image. Moreover,
for the believer, true righteousness is only attainable through
the intervention of God in his life; for Judaism that intervention
is the giving of the law, for Christianity, the giving of Christ
and the Holy Spirit.
Humanistic theorists reject the idea that there is any
ultimate source of goodness outside of man's own nature. Accord-
ing to Erich Fromm (1950), man harms himself when he attributes
his own goodness and strength to a metaphysical other:
He projects what he has onto God and thus impover-
ishes himself. Now God has all love, all wisdom,
all justice - and man is deprived of these
qualities... this mechanism of projection is the
very same which can be observed in interpersonal
relationships of a masochistic submissive nature.
(pg. 50)
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Another point of keen controversy is man's proper relationship
to God. Traditional Christianity, Judaism, and Islam see man as
totally dependent on God, and as owing him worship and obedience.
These three fundamental beliefs are all challenged by humanistic
therapists.
Rollo May views "dependency" on God as a regression to an
infantile helplessness. He concludes that the eating of the apple
by Adam and Eve represented man's first step toward healthy auto-
nomy from God. His choice of this example only serves to point
out how diametrically opposed the traditional and humanistic con-
cepts of religion are. Both for Judaism and Christianity, the
eating of the apple is seen as the epitome of the cardinal sin,
rebellion against God. In fact, Christianity sees it as the most
tragic moment in history, when sin and death entered the world,
and worse, man himself.
Erich Fromm (1950) attacks the basic religious idea that God
should be worshiped for much the same reasons he objected to His
being designated the source of goodness.
In worshipping God he tries to get in touch with
that part of himself he has lost through projec-
tion. After giving God all he has, he begs God
to return some of what was originally his own. .
.
in order to persuade God to give him some of his
love he must prove how utterly deprived he is of
love; in order to persuade God to guide him by
His superior wisdom he must prove how deprived he
is of wisdom.
(pg. 50-51)
Finally, May (1969) contests the traditional premise that man
should obey God. According to May, obedience makes one less ethical,
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because a conscience must develop through creative and independent
action. Obedience, on the other hand, is viewed as a kind of
passive non-thinking ethical behaviour. Simply put, Self, not God,
should be the arbiter of morality.
All of these diverse areas of conflict seem to be reduceable
to one factor, the relative place of God and man with respect to
each other. We have said that humanistic psychology was the logical
extension of the early humanists' position, which placed more
emphasis on man's talent and potential, and less on God and
salvation, than the early Church liked. Humanistic psychology has
simply further elevated man and further devalued God. God began
as the center of the Universe, with man his small, helpless,
flawed creation. Now man is not flawed; he and his potential are
the source of all goodness. He is not dependent on God, nor
should he worship or obey Him. In fact, finally the inevitable
has happened; man has simply replaced God altogether as the center
of religious attention:
Humanistic religion, on the contrary, is centered
around man and his strength. .. Inasmuch as human-
istic religions are theistic, God is a symbol of
man' s own powers . .
.
(Fromm, 1950, pg. 37)
Perhaps the last step is to say simply that man is God. In
You Shall Be As Gods
,
Fromm (1966) takes this step as does Maslow
in Religions Values and Peak Experiences (1964). Fromm goes so
far as to say that worship of anything outside of man is idolatry.
There is at least one more debate which deserves mention; it
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concerns whether there is such a thing as absolute moral or theo-
logical truth. According to traditional religion, the propositions
and commandments expressed in Scripture are God's perfect unchanging
revelation. The belief that these propositions are true, to the
exclusion of all others which may contradict them, is the bulwark
of these faiths.
Humanistic psychologists flatly reject both the idea that any
one religion or philosophy has either an exclusive or perfect
revelation, or that these propositions are even important.
According to Maslow the key to human growth is the peak experience.
That experience can be had in any religious or nonreligious context.
Therefore, the differing beliefs of these groups are not significant,
only the common experience they all share:
Koestler also said it well, 'But because the experi-
ence is inarticulate, has no sensory shape, color
or words it lends itself to transcription in many
forms, including visions of the cross, or the
Goddess Kali... thus a genuine mystic experience
may mediate a bona fide conversion to practically
any creed, Christianity, Buddhism or Fire Worship'.
I have therefore, paid no attention to these
localisms since they cancel each other out. I
take the generalized peak-experience to be that
which is common to all places and times.
(Maslow, 1964, pg. 73)
Thus, traditional religionists are clutching the cookie box,
mistaking it for the cookies. They act as if doctrine were paramount,
when in fact what is really important is the peak experience which
can take place in the context of any belief system. Partially
because of this tendency on the part of traditional religion to
"concretize" religious symbols and languages,
"...transcendent
experiences seem to occur more frequently in people who have
rejected their inherited religion.
.
. (Maslow, 1964, pg. 34)."
This debate might seem somewhat academic until one realizes
that some of the propositions held most firmly by traditional
religionists are ones which define moral behaviour. Traditional
religious stands against pre-marital sex, abortion, extra-marital
sex, homosexuality and divorce, among other issues, have been
fiercely attacked by humanistic, as well as most other schools of
psychology. Carl Rogers, in his book, Becoming Partners: Marriage
and its Alternatives (1971), expresses the humanistic view:
We still hold that traditional and religious
sanctions, and codes of morality, taken from the
past never be broken... to give them their old
fashioned names, 'living in sin, 1 'committing
adultery, 1 'lewd and lascivious conduct,'
'fornication,' 'homosexuality,' 'ingesting illegal
drugs,' even ' soliciting '.. .when engaged in by
individuals struggling to find a better pattern
of partnership, the old fashioned names are
frankly ridiculous.
(pg. 213-214)
In summary, it is clear that traditional religion and human-
istic psychology are entrenched in conflict at the level of their
most fundamental assumptions. What may not have come across in
this brief description is the intensity with which the conflict is
felt on both sides. As one scans the humanistic psychologists'
texts, one finds a series of "new-fashioned names" they have found
for traditional religion. Maslow calls it "pathological" and
"crippled religion." He says it decreases self-actualization and
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describes one group of typical American Evangelicals as "intellectual
primitives." May says that traditional Christianity is for "weak-
lings" and calls fundamentalism "idiotic." Erich Fromm likens
traditional religion to spiritual Nazism and calls it "idolatry."
Finally Rogers finds traditional religious morality "ridiculous."
The hostility of humanistic psychology for traditional religion is
indeed real.
The Validity of the Charges
How justified are psychologists 1 negative evaluations of tradi-
tional religion, and what bearing should this have on the admission
of people to training in clinical psychology? Simplifying the
objection of each school to the traditionally religious, psycho-
analysts believe they are neurotic, behaviorist believe they are
un-scientif ic and humanists believe they are authoritarian and
dogmatic. The validity of these three charges will be briefly
reviewed.
An extensive review by Sanua (1969) of the literature on
religion and mental health found no systematic relationship of
either a positive or negative nature between religiosity and
psychological adjustment or social deviancy. Similarly, a review
by Gartner (in press) of the self-esteem literature showed no
systematic relationship between religiosity and self-esteem for
either traditionally or non-traditionally religious subjects.
A growing body of evidence seems to suggest that the way in
which someone is religious is more crucial to their mental health
than how traditional or how religious they are. Benson and Spilka
(1973), for example, failed to find any relationship between reli-
giosity and self-esteem, but found self-esteem positively related
to loving God-images and negatively related to un-loving and con-
trolling God-images. These results have been replicated by several
investigators for both traditionally and non-traditionally religious
subjects (Ellison & Economos 1981).
There is little research, if any, on how objective tradition-
ally religious scientists are, but the traditionally religious are
well represented in the sciences and appear to perform competently
(Maloney, 1972). The image of the religious person as un-scientif ic
seems to spring from the historical conflicts between the church
and scientific community (Blum, Cameron and Barnes, 1970) and the
knowledge that religious individuals hold some beliefs based on
faith rather than on empirical study.
Increasingly, however, secular psychologists are acknowledg-
ing that they too hold beliefs and values not amenable to experi-
mental verification (Lowe, 1959). Yet, this is not construed as
an impediment to their ability to conduct competent and responsible
research.
Indeed, the areas in which secular psychologists and the tradi-
tionally religious disagree are often those very same areas which
are not amenable to empirical test by either party. For example,
one Christian scholar (Van Leevwen, 1978) has argued that Christians
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cannot accept "ontological behaviorism", i.e., the metaphysical
assumptions behind the discipline such as determinism, material!
and mental processlessness. Of course, none of these assumptions
is testable. Yet, she argues that Christians can fully participate
in "methodological and applied behaviorism", that is, the practice
of behavioral research and therapy. Thus, both religious and non-
religious scientists hold untested or untestable assumptions, but
only in the case of the religious scientists is it suggested that
this might be unscientific.
Experimental evidence has been presented which suggests that
religious people are more authoritarian than the non-religious
(Adomo et al.
,
1950; Jones, 1958; Putney and Midleton, 1961).
More specifically, a positive relationship has been found between
orthodox religious belief and authoritarianism (Gregory, 195 7),
and Christian fundamentalists have been discovered to be more
authoritarian than non-fundamentalists (Shills, 1954). Finally,
Milton Rok.ea.ch (1960) found Catholics and Protestants to be more
dogmatic than non-believers.
Charges that the traditionally religious are dogmatic and
authoritarian are particularly relevant to questions of their
ability to practice effective psychotherapy. Presumably, the
qualities associated with those traits (closed raindedness, ethno-
centrisra, prejudice, ambiguity avoidance, unthinking convention-
alism and aggressive submissive tendencies) would interfere with
therapist effectiveness.
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Research consistent with the broad theoretical formulations
of Adomo et al.
, (1950) and Rokeach (1960), at least partially
confirm predictions of a negative impact of authoritarianism and
dogmatism on qualities associated with positive therapeutic out-
come. Hood (1974) found that dogmatic subjects were more negative
in both their cognitive and affective evaluation of mental patients
than non-dogmatic subjects. Authoritarian subjects were found to
project their own feelings and beliefs onto others more often than
the non-authoritarian (Christie & Cook, 1956; Scodel and Mussen,
1953). More directly related to psychotherapy, therapists lower
in dogmatism had more psychological insights in sessions (Wright,
1975), and were more effective (Boland, 1973), than therapists low
in dogmatism. At least two studies (Ringler, 1977; Winans, 1973),
however, failed to find any relationship between therapist
authoritarianism, dogmatism and therapy outcome. Thus, more
research needs to be done on the variables influencing the effect
of this trait.
Unfortunately, the above mentioned classic studies linking
religion, authoritarianism and dogmatism share a serious methodo-
logical flaw that is found in much of the psychological research
on religion, namely the confusion of mental health with liberal
ideology (Gartner, 1981, in press).
Many of the items on the well known F and dogmatism scales
appear to measure the rigid, well defended, domineering/subservient
personality traits which they purport to measure. Others, however,
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are measures of ideology. One example, is the following item from
the authoritarian submission sub-scale of the F-scale: "Every
person should have a deep faith in some supernatural force higher
than himself, to which he gives total allegiance and whose
decisions he should not question" (from Adorno et al.
,
1960, pg.
231). While the phrase "should not question" is a bit strong, if
that phrase were replaced with the word "accept", this sentence
would be a perfect summary of one of the most basic principles of
traditional Judiasra and Christianity.
Thus, questions measuring an authoritarian personality and
ones measuring conservative ideology appear to be indiscriminately
combined. The discovery of this confound suggests that the
relationship between authoritarianism, dogmatism and religion
might not be as strong as previously believed, for obviously
traditionally religious people will respond positively to items
which measure traditionalism and traditional religiosity. In
fairness, it should be mentioned that the above item has been
shown to correlate well with the rest of the FXscale, and discrim-
inate effectively between subjects high and low in anti-seraatism.
Thus, there are valid statistical, as well as conceptual reasons
for including it. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that any
personality test which automatically scores traditionally religious
responses as pathological, even if there is reason to hypothesize
such a relationship, is unfairly biased against religious subjects.
It is the equivalent of including questions measuring social class
on an I.Q. test because a strong relationship between class and
I.Q. has been observed.
However, if any relationship exists between traditional
religiosity and these traits, is it legitimate for professors of
clinical psychology to be wary of fundamentalist applicants? This
author thinks not, for such logic makes almost any group an easy
target for discrimination. Almost every sub-population has some
negative way in which they statistically differ from the general
population as a group, but that does not mean that any given
individual group member has those negative traits.
For example, as a group, Blacks evidence higher rates of
criminal behavior, psychosis and lower academic acheivement than
Whites (Curtis, 1975; Hollingshead & Redlich 1958; Loehlin, et al.,
1975). Should we suspect all Black applicants on these grounds?
Obvious ly , most Blacks are not criminals
,
psychotic , or of sub-
normal intelligence. Neither are all fundamentalists authoritarian
and dogmatic (Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967). To pre-judge, or even
suspect, an applicant on these grounds is discrimination, however
subtle
.
One factor that deserves to be borne in mind is that self-
selection is a powerful force in determining who applies to
graduate school. Even though a higher proportion of Blacks than
Whites are criminals and psychotics, not many black criminals or
psychotics put in applications to graduate school in clinical
psychology. Similarly, fundamentalists who rigidly defend them-
selves against non-Christian ideas are not likely to apply to
graduate school in a field as notoriously secular and humanistic
as clinical psychology.
CHAPTER II
THE STUDY
General Purpose and Hypothesis
The preceding literature review clearly shows that a strong
tension exists between traditional religion and modern psychology.
This raises a number of provocative questions about how psycholo-
gists respond to religious people. One of the most compelling of
these questions is the subject of this study. What effect does an
applicant's traditional religiosity (in this case, fundamentalist
Christianity) have on his/her chances for admission to a graduate
program in clinical psychology? While the previous literature
review suggests that there are substantial anti-traditional reli-
gious attitudes among many clinical psychologists, will these
attitudes manifest themselves in discriminatory behavior?
A surprisingly large body of research (Aj zen & Fishbein, 1977)
seems to suggest that prejudicial attitudes often have little cor-
respondence to discriminatory practices. According to Aj zen and
Fishbein (1977) the primary problem with studies failing to show a
correspondence between attitude and behavior is the dissimilarity
between the attitude measure employed and the behavior studied.
Specifically, the more closely related the attitude in question is
to the a) specific behavior in question, b) target of that behavior
and, c) context of that behavior, the greater the correspondence
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one discovers between attitude and behavior.
A careful examination of the procedures that real admissions
committees use in their evaluation of applicants suggests that
some relationship should be found between attitude and admissions
behavior.
A) Specific Behavior : "Admissions behavior" in many ways
does not resemble a behavior at all in the common sense use of the
term. Rather, it involves making a judgement or evaluation process
that we think of as more cognitive. If one thinks of a negative
attitude towards a group as an evaluation, then one could argue
that admissions "behavior" is more intimately linked to attitude
than most.
B) Targe t : Attitudes are often about groups; whereas indivi-
duals are usually the target of discrimination. This is a source
of non-correspondence between many measures of attitude and
behavior used in psychological studies. So too, in this case it
is individual applicants who are evaluated not fundamentalists as
a group.
However, inasmuch as at least the first phase of application
rating involves reading large numbers of relatively brief appli-
cations, rather than lengthy face-to-face interaction, professors
might respond to some applicants as if they were "typical group
members" rather than individuals. To the extent that they do fall
into this trap, the target of admissions behavior is the same as
the target of attitudes.
C) Context: The context of application rating is not face-
to-face interaction, even if an interview has taken place before
or after the evaluation process. This strongly alters the cost
discomfort involved in making a prejudicially negative evaluation.
Many studies which fail to show a correspondence between attitude
and behavior do so because the negative attitude is expressed in
private, but the discriminatory behavior involves face-to-face
interaction with the target at the time the behavior is performed.
A second area of research more specific to the topic of this
study than attitude-behavior correspondence, is research on the
influence of social stereotypes on person perception. Extensive
findings (Snyder, 1979) suggest that people substantially distort
their perceptions of individuals to conform to their stereotypes
of "typical" group members. Subjects have repeatedly been shown
to mis-remember and mis-perceive information, and even to act in
such a way as to elicit behavior from others which reinforce their
stereotypic beliefs.
On the basis of these findings, we would expect that subjects 1
negative stereotypes about fundamentalist Christians would greatly
influence their perception of an individual fundamentalist applicant
Obviously, such distortions in perception should exert an influence
on subject's evaluations of an applicant and thus on the outcome
of the admissions process. As mentioned earlier, admissions
"behavior" contains a strong cognitive component. Inasmuch as
person perception is also a cognitive process, the potentially
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powerful influence of social stereotypes must be recognized.
Given that a relationship between psychologists negative
attitudes towards traditional religion and their admissions
behavior is posited, the experimental hypotheses are as follows:
Experimental Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 ; Professors of clinical psychology will discri-
minate against applicants on the basis of their fundamentalist
Christian belief alone. Thus, a fundamentalist applicant will be
perceived more negatively, and be less likely to be admitted than
an identical applicant of no known religious orientation.
Following the same logic, the more intimate the connection
between a person f s religious beliefs and their practice of psycho-
therapy, the more potential for contamination. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 : Fundamentalist Christian candidates who wish
to integrate their practice of psychology with their religious
orientation will be perceived more negatively and be less likely
to be admitted than both an identical applicant who has no known
religious orientation, and one who is simply a fundamentalist.
Hypothesis 3 : A variety of demographic and personal factors
may affect how strongly subjects respond to the applicant T s funda-
mentalist orientation.
Hypothesis 3a : Subjects who are themselves more religious
may respond more positively to the fundamentalist applicants than
those who are less religious.
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Hypothesis 3b: The subjects' own religion may affect their
perception of the applicant. Specifically, in light of troubled
Jewish-Christian relations over the centuries, Jews may react more
negatively to fundamentalist Christians than Gentiles.
Hypothesis 3c: The subjects geographic region of origin and
current residence may affect their response to the applicant.
Specifically subjects from the South and Midwest, where funda-
mentalist Christianity is more common, may react more positively
to the fundamentalist than Northeasterners and Westerners.
In addition, the subject's sex, age, race, psychological
orientation and the size of the program where they teach may have
some unpredicted relationship to their perception of the fundamen-
talist applicant.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Overview
The subjects of this study were professors of clinical psy-
chology, who were asked to evaluate a hypothetical applicant to
graduate school. Each subject received one of three applicants
who were identical, except with regard to religious orientation.
The first applicant (control) professed no religious orientation;
the second (fundamentalist) was a fundamentalist Christian and the
third (integrationist) was also a fundamentalist who wished to
integrate his study of psychology with his religious orientation.
Inasmuch as the three applicants are identical in all other respects,
significant differences in the evaluations given the three appli-
cants will be attributable to their religious orientation.
Similar methods have been used in the study of sexual discri-
mination. Goldberg (1968) found that articles submitted to psycho-
logical journals with male authors were more likely to be accepted
than identical articles with female authors. Walster and Cleary
(1970) found that resumes reflecting moderate ability which bore
female names were less likely to result in job offers than identical
resumes bearing male names.
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Subjects
Subjects were full-time professors of clinical psychology
working at A. P. A. approved graduate training programs. A question-
naire was mailed to every known such individual in the United States,
excluding those working at two institutions attended by the author
(University of Massachusetts and New York University), and two
graduate programs with an explicitly religious orientation (Fuller
Theological Seminary and Brigham Young University). In addition,
two programs refused/ failed to participate. Nine hundred and
seventy questionnaires were mailed and 356 were returned, yielding
a response rate of 37%.
Seventy-eight percent of the sample was male. The mean age
was 4 2 years (s.d. = 10, range 26-70) and the mean number of
years since receipt of the Ph.D. was 14. (s.d. = 9.7, range = 1-38).
An overwhelming 98% of the sample was White. Twenty-eight percent
lived in the Northeast, 30% in the South, 27% in the Midwest, and
15% in the far Western region of the United States. Twenty-five
percent of the sample was Jewish, 23% Protestant, 6% Catholic, 3%
other and 43% claimed no religious affiliation. Thirty-five
percent of the subjects described themselves as behaviorally
oriented, 22% psychodynamic , 18% ecclectic, 6% humanistic, 3%
family systems, 2% empirical, 5% other and 8% claimed no orienta-
tion. The average number of students enrolled in the programs in
which subjects taught was 55. (s.d. = 32, range = 10-300).
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Finally, 96% of the sample had participated in graduate admissions,
indicating that this indeed was the appropriate population for a
study on this topic.
Materials
The only materials used in this study were two cover letters
which accompanied the study, three two-page "mock applications" to
graduate school in clinical psychology, a one-page questionnaire,
and of course, envelopes, stamps and return stamped self-addressed
envelopes. (See Appendix).
The first cover letter was signed by David Todd, Director of
Clinical Training at the University of Massachusetts. It stated
simply that enclosed was a study on factors affecting graduate
admissions to programs in clinical psychology being undertaken as
a thesis project by one of his advisees. He added that this is an
important area of research, and asked his colleagues to fill it
out if they can find the time. The second letter, written by the
investigator, contained a similar explanation and plea, as well as
assuring complete anonymity to all subjects and a summary of the
results to those who wished one.
The "mock applications" contained name, age, address, under-
graduate institution, general G.P.A., psychology G.P.A, G.R.E.
scores and a two-page personal statement. Though letters of
recommendation were not included, subjects were told that the
applicants 1 letters were from "good to excellent."
Three different applications were used in this study. They
were identical in all respects except in the statements the appli-
cant made concerning religion. The control made no statement con-
cerning religion. The second applicant, who we shall call the
"fundamentalist," volunteered that he was a born-again fundamentalist
Christian. Finally the third applicant, who we shall call "the
integrationist," was also a fundamentalist and wished to integrate
his faith with his study and practice of psychology.
The applicants possessed strong but not outstanding academic
qualifications (college - Wesleyan, general G.P.A. = 3.5, psych-
ology G.P.A. = 3.65, G.R.E. scores = V 670, M 610, A 620).
Research has shown that biases show up most clearly in the evalua-
tion of candidates with moderate, rather than weak or outstanding
credentials (Walster & Clearly, 1970).
The personal statements described, in brief, a history of the
applicant's life and the process of personal evolution which led
him into the field of psychology.
The applicant came from a family constellation of two somewhat
rigid and successful married parents and a schizophrenic sibling
who violated all of his parent's rules of propriety. Paul (the
applicant) grew up as an unusually responsible and competent over-
achiever much like his parents, until his first year of college,
after which he took two years off to explore the world and his own
emotions while living in Boston. There the fundamentalist and
integrationist applicants "became interested in Christianity. In
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the person and teaching of Christ, I saw a perfect synthesis of
the qualities I was trying to integrate, justice/ reason and love/
emotion. Partially as a result of this, or partially as the result
of a religious experience, I became a born-again fundamentalist
Christian in the Fall of 1977, and still am to this day."
At this time also, all three applicants became interested in
psychology and more seriously professionally minded. They worked
at the Boston V.A. administering and later training others to
administer a token economy system, and became involved in an on-
going research project. Upon returning to Wesleyan, Paul became
Vice-President of the Peer Counseling organization, presented a
paper on "Recent trends in psychoanalytic theories of severe
psychopathology," and wrote a senior thesis using data from the
V.A.
,
comparing the effectiveness of behavior modification and
psychotherapy with different sub-types of schizophrenics. All
applicants wished to continue their research in severe psychopath-
ology. After serious consideration of the research interests and
orientations of the faculty at the subject f s institution, Paul felt
his/her school would be an excellent place for him to continue his
studies. The integrationist added at this point that he would like
to integrate his faith with his study and practice of psychology.
"While I am in graduate school, and after graduation, I hope to
integrate the clinical skills I learn with my Christian beliefs in
the work I do with clients. I also hope to do research on issues
related to Christian belief and psychology."
Every subject received only one of these three hypothetical
applications. After reading the "mock application" they were aslced
to fill ou t the questionnaire stapled behind it, which contained
several rating scales. On a scale of one to five, respondents are
asked to rate their "good feelings" about "the applicant's ability
to make a good clinical psychologist" and separately their "doubts"
about the same. On a nine-point-scale they were asked to rate
"whether it is of more or less than average importance to interview
this applicant as compared to others in the final pool before
making an "admissions decision." Finally, they were asked to rate
on a nine-point-scale "the probability of their voting to admit
this applicant to their own program."
A second portion of the questionnaire asked subjects to give
information about themselves. First, they were asked to rate, on
a five-point-scale, the importance of the following in their own
lives: teaching, research, clinical work, family, religion,
politics and culture. Secondly, they were asked to indicate their
sex, age, years since Ph.D., race, state of origin, state now
residing, religion, theroretical orientation, size of the program
where they taught and whether they had ever been involved in
graduate admissions. A space was also provided for comments.
Self-addressed envelopes were enclosed for the return of the
questionnaire. A small mark, made by the experimenter, on the
bottom left-hand corner indicated the subject's experimental
condition.
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Proced ure
The names of subjects were obtained in two ways. Using Graduate
Study in Psychology (A.P.A., 1979) as a guide, a postcard was sent
to the clinical secretary of every A. P. A. approved program in the
United States, requesting a list of their full-time graduate clinical
faculty. Those programs which did not respond in three weeks were
called by telephone and asked to give the information over the
telephone
.
The two cover letters, one "mock application", one question-
naire and a stamped self-addressed envelope were sent to every
name received, at the university address. Experimental conditions
were created by arbitrarily distributing the three applications.
After a four-month waiting period the information from the
356 returned questionnaires was coded, put onto computer cards,
and analyzed using the S.P.S.S. computer program.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Response Rate
Three hundred and fifty-six, or 37%, of the 970 questionnaires
mailed out were returned. The control, fundamentalist and inte-
grationist conditions were composed of 121, 125 and 110 subjects
respectively.
Comparability of Groups
The three groups did not differ significantly on any of the
questions which subjects answered about themselves (hereafter
called "demographic variables") except geographic location.
One-way ANOVAS were performed to detect differences between
groups on the continuous demographic variables. No significant
differences were found between the three groups with respect to
age, number of years since Ph.D., number of students in the pro-
gram where they teach or religiosity.
Chi square tests were performed to determine if the groups
varied on any of the discontinuous demographic variables. A mar-
ginally significant difference in geographic location was found.
2
(jC 11.37, d.f. = 6, 2_ = •078). The control group was composed
of 24% Northeasterners, 33% Southerners, 24% Midwesterners and 19%
far Westerners. The fundamentalist condition consisted of 32%
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Northeasterners, 31% Southerners, 30% Midwesterners and 7% far
Westerners. Finally, the integrationis t condition contained 26%
Northeasterners, 26% Southerners, 27% Midwesterners and 20% far
Westerners
.
No significant differences were found between the three groups
with respect to sex, geographic region of origin, religion or
psychological orientation. (Race and previous involvement with
admissions were not analyzed inasmuch as an overwhelming majority
of the sample was white (98%) and had been involved with admissions
(96%).) Thus, overall, the three groups were quite evenly matched
on the demographic variables.
Group Differences on the Dependent Variables
As mentioned earlier, subjects were asked to rate the hypo-
thetical applicant in terms of their 1) good feelings, 2) doubts,
3) need to interview and 4) probability of admitting him. The
differences in the ratings of these three groups were analyzed by
simple one-way ANOVAS and subsequent Newman Keuls post-hoc com-
parisons.
The groups differed very significantly on the extent of their
"good feelings about the applicant's ability to make a good clinical
psychologist" (£ - 16, d.f. = 2,355, j> .0001). Subjects in the
control group felt significantly more positive (j> .05) about
their applicant (X = 2.4, s.d. - 1) than did subjects in both the
fundamentalist condition (X = 1.92, s.d. = .98) and integrationist
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condition (X = 1.66 q d = cm t+ . „ j-\^ i oo, s.a. -
.y/;. It was predicted that the
Fundamentalist applicant would be more highly rated than the
Integrationist on all four dependent variables. On this question
results were in the expected direction but did not achieve signi-
ficance (See Figure 1).
The three groups also differed very significantly on the degree
of "doubt they [the respondents] felt about the applicant's ability
to make a good clinical psychologist" (F = 10.5, d.f. = 2,359,
£< .0001). The control group (X = 1.48, s.d. = 1.1) reported less
doubt (£<.05) than subjects in both the fundamentalist condition
(X = 1.86, s.d. = .84) and integrationist condition (X = 1.96,
s.d. = .88). Again, on this question, the difference between the
Fundamentalist and Integrationist applicants was in the expected
direction, but failed to achieve significance (See Figure 2).
Groups differed very significantly on the extent to which
"compared to other applicants in the final pool it would be of
more or less than average importance to interview this applicant
before making a final decision" (F = 8.9, d.f. - 2,359, £ = .0002).
Subjects in both the fundamentalist (X - 6.8, s.d. = 1.7) and
integrationist (X = 6.58, s.d. = 2) conditions believed that an
interview was more critical (j> <.05) than did subjects in the
control group. (X = 5.85, s.d. = 1.8). The Fundamentalist and
Integrationist applicants did not differ significantly from one
another (See Figure 3).
Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this study,
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Fig. 1. Subjects' good feelings about the applicant's potential
make a good clinical psychologist as a function of group.
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Fig. 2. Subjects' doubts about the applicant's potential to make
a good clinical psychologist as a function of group.
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Fig. 3. Subjects' need to interview the applicant as a function
of group.
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the three groups differed very significantly on the likelihood that
the respondent would vote to accept the applicant (F = 7.1, d.f. =
2,259, £ = .0009). Subjects in the control group (X = 5.66,
s.d. = 2.4) were more likely to admit the applicant (p_ ^ .05) than
both subjects in the fundamentalist (X = 5.05, s.d. = 2.2) and
integrationist (X = 4.54, s.d. = 2.2) conditions. Once again, the
difference between the Fundamentalist and Integrationist applicants
was in the expected direction but failed to achieve significance
(See Figure 4)
.
In summary, the control applicant fared significantly better
than both religious applicants on all four variables. On three out
of four questions (good feelings, doubts and probability of admitting),
the fundamentalist was rated more highly than the integrationist,
but in no case was the difference significant.
Intercorrelation of the Dependent Variables
Collapsing across groups, questions 1 (good feelings), 2
(doubts), and 4 (probability of admitting) were highly correlated
(Q
l
- Q
2
,
r =
-.70, £ = .001; - Q4> r = .77, £ = .001; Q 2
- Q
£ = .70, £ = .001). In contrast, question 3 (need to interview)
correlated only weakly with the other three variables (Q^ - Q^,
r = .07, £ = .085; Q£ - Q 3> r = .11, £ = .021; Q 3 - Q^, r = .12,
£ = .01). Thus, at least on this task, having good feelings about
an applicant's ability to make a good clinical psychologist is
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Fig, 4. Subjects 1 likelihood of admitting the applicant as a
function of group.
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strongly associated with having few doubts about his ability and
also with one's probability of voting to admit him. The need to
interview an applicant more or less than others in the final group,
however, appears to be a more independent factor.
Relationship Between the Demographic and Dependent Variables
The relationship between the demographic variables and the
subject's ratings of the applicant was also assessed. Due to the
large number of demographic variables (9), their effect on only
one dependent variable was analyzed to reduce the probability of
experiment-wise error. The subject's probability of admitting the
applicant was chosen because it is of the greatest theoretical
importance and correlates strongly with the first two questions
(good feelings and doubts).
The relationship between the continuous demographic variables
and the subject's probability of admitting the applicant was
assessed by means of hierarchical multiple regression. Group
(i.e., experimental condition) was dummy coded, and the group by
demographic variable interaction term was obtained by multiplying
the demographic variable and the dummy codes. The variables were
entered into the regression equation in the following order:
demographic variable, group variables, group x demographic variable
interaction. The only significant finding was a main effect for
2
age (F = 13.5, R change = .041, d.f. = 348, £ - .012), indicating
that older subjects in all conditions were more likely to admit
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the applicant than younger subjects.
The relationship between the discontinuous demographic vari-
ables and the subject's probability of admitting the applicant was
analyzed by two-way ANOVA (Group X Demographic Variable). No
significant results were obtained. However, the effect of
geographic region and religion were reassessed by combining groups
in accordance with experimental hypothesis.
The effect of geographic region was reanalyzed twice, once
combining Southerners and Midwesterners into one group and North-
easterners and far Westerners into another, and a second time
dividing subjects into Northeasterners and non-Northeasterners.
In both cases no significant results were found.
Religion, originally divided into Protestant, Catholic, Jew,
None and Other was, in accordance with experimental predictions,
reorganized into two groups, Jew and Gentile. When the relationship
of religion to probability of admission was reanalyzed, a significant
group by religion interaction was discovered (Religion Main effect:
F » 1, d.f. = 1,344,
_p_
=
.32; Group X Religion Interaction:
_F = 3.38,
d.f. = 2,344,
_p_
= «035), suggesting that Jews and Gentiles respond
differently to the three hypothetical applicants used in this study.
After discovering significant differences between Jews and
Gentiles in their probability of admitting the applicant, the effect
of religion of rater (again divided into Jew and Gentile) on the
other dependent variables was assessed. The subjects' religion
did not significantly influence their good feelings or doubts about
the applicant, but did significantly influence the need they felt
to interview him (Religion Main Effect: F = 6.6, d.f. = 1,342
£ = .011; Group X Religion Interaction: F = 2.73, d.f. = 2 342
P = .066).
To locate the source of the variation between Jewish and
Gentile subjects a total of nine planned comparisons were employed.
Jews in the control group were compared to Jews in the fundamenta-
list and integrationist conditions, who were also compared to each
other. Similarly, Gentiles in the control group were compared to
Gentiles in the fundamentalist and integrationist conditions, who
were also compared to each other. Finally, Jews in the control
group were compared to Gentiles in the control group, Jews in the
fundamentalist condition to Gentiles in the fundamentalist
condition and Jews in the integrationist condition to Gentiles in
the integrationist condition. The family-wise error rate for the
set of comparisons was set at .1 (Meyers, 1979). Thus, the alpha
level for each comparison was .01.
Gentiles in the control group were significantly less likely
to require an interview than both Gentiles in the fundamentalist
(F = 11.53, d.f. = 1,86, £ 5=r .01) and integrationist conditions
(F = 11.79, d.f. = 1.87, £<,.01). Jews in the control group were
less likely to require an interview than Jews in both the funda-
mentalist (F = 5.0, d.f. = 1,29, £ < .05) and integrationist con-
ditions (F = 10.4, d.f. = 1,21, £<.01). However, the difference
between Jews in the control and fundamentalist conditions was only
ion
significant at the .05 level. Plnally> Jews „ ^ ^
condition „ete more likely to requlre a„ ^
in the same condition (F = 15 9 d f 1 so ,
-
' t
-
~ 1
» 5 2, p <.01). (see
Figure 5).
Gentiles in the control group were significantly more likely
to admit the applicant than Gentiles in the integration!^ condit
only (F = 6.7, d.f. = 1,87, £ < .01). m contrast> Jews - n ^
control group were significantly more likely to admit the applicant
than Jews in both the fundamentalist (F = 10.8, d.f. = 1,29, £ <.01)
and integrationist conditions (F = 16.8, d.f. = 1,20, p_ < .01).
Finally, Jews in the control group were significantly more likely
to admit the applicant than Gentiles in the control group (F = 10.0,
d.f. = 1,58,, £ < .01). (See Figure 6).
Effect Size
An important, but frequently overlooked, aspect of statistical
analyses is effect size (Cohen and Cohen, 1975; Cohen, 1977). The
independent variables found to have a significant influence on
subject's response were the experimental manipulation and the
subject's own religion. Multiple regression including these two
factors were performed for each of the dependent variables. R
2
was
.06, .08, .06, .08 for questions 1, (good feeling) 2, (doubts)
3 (need to interview and 4 (probability of admission) respectively,
indicating that between 6% and 8% of the variance was accounted
for by these factors.
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Fig. 5. Subjects' need to interview the applicant as a functi
of group and religion.
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Fig. 6. Subjects' likelihood of admitting the applicant
function of group and religion.
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While these effect sizes sound small, they are actually just
less than average relative to other research in the behavioral
scieuces. Jacob Cohen (1977) developed a measure of effect size
he calls f
.
The f values of the four one-way ANOVAS comparing
groups on variables 1 though 4 were
.242, .188, .174, and .166
(X = .192) respectively. Cohen defines
. 1 as a "small" effect
size and
.25 as "medium" or average. Thus, these effects are
between small and medium, closer to medium.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Empirical Support for the Experimental Hypotheses
HyP° theSiS 1 ; "lessors of clinical psychology will discri.
minate against an applicant on the basis of their fundamentalist
Christian belief alone. Thus, a fundamentalist applicant will be
perceived more negatively and be less likely to be admitted to
graduate school than an identical applicant with no known religious
belief."
Results clearly support hypothesis 1. The Fundamentalist
applicant was identical to the Control applicant in all respects,
except that he was a fundamentalist Christian. The Fundamentalist
was perceived more negatively than the Control, and was less likely
to be admitted to graduate school by professors of clinical psychology.
Thus, isolated charges of religious discrimination against born-again
Christians seeking admission to graduate school in clinical psychology,
may be more typical of a widespread bias in the field.
To put these results in perspective, however, a few factors
which limit the generalizability of this study should be discussed.
First, there is no way to determine from the information available
to what extent these results are specific to the experimental stimuli,
i.e., the applicant used in this study. There may be aspects of his
self-presentation which interact with the subject's perception of
68
his religious orientation. For example, the applicant is rather
self-revelatory; he mentions some intimate personal problems he
has dealt with, and speaks of his religious belief in the context
of a conversion experience. This combination of factors might
make the applicant appear less stable than a fundamentalist appli-
cant presenting a different constellation of traits and experiences
Secondly, this applicant presented credentials which were competi-
tive but only moderate in quality. Research (Walster & Cleary,
1970) has shown that biases show up most strongly against this
type of applicant, as opposed to those who are clearly unqualified
or outstanding. A better methodology, which could be employed in
a future study, would be to use an assortment of applicants. Such
"random sampling of stimuli" reduces the risk of obtaining results
specific to one experimental condition (Holt, 1978; Epstein, 1981).
A second limitation of this study is that it only simulates
the admissions process. In making a real admissions decision,
professors would be able to gain more information about the appli-
cant through actual letters and interviews. The fact that subjects
indicated an above-average need to interview the Christian appli-
cants at once indicates a greater suspicion of them, but also a
legitimate desire to gain more information. Interviews might
provide a chance to distinguish between Christian applicants who
do and do not present problems, without discriminating against
them as a group.
It is unclear, however, how easily an individuals suspicions
can be allayed by a half-hour Interview. Research reviewed earlier
(Snyder, 1979) demonstrates that people substantially distort their
perceptions of individuals to conform to their stereotypes of
"typical" group members. Secondly, even if the letters and inter-
view allayed many doubts, simple common sense dictates that an
admissions committee is unlikely to accept an even slightly "risky-
applicant when many others with equal qualifications, who do not
present such potential problems, clamor for the same few openings.
Thus, it remains to be seen a) how strongly professors of
clinical psychology are biased against fundamentalist Christians
in general, b) to what extent they simply fear a certain type of
fundamentalist who is harshly judgemental, dogmatic and inflexible
and c) how able psychology professors are to distinguish between
the two. Future research might replicate this study with interviews
and letters, or even better, with confederates who participate in
the actual admissions process as applicants.
A third limitation of this study concerns the question, how
representative is this sample of the entire population of clinical
psychology professors? As with most mail surveys, only a minority
(37%) of the people receiving questionnaires returned them.
Inevitably, the qu3estion arises, is there any systematic difference
between the people who responded and those who did not? If there
is, then the results may by typical only of the sub-group similar
to the people who completed the survey and not the population as a
whole
.
There Is no readily apparent way to determine how representa-
tive our samp le was (as there often is not). However, this stndy
is nnusual in that its sample represents over a third of the entire
population. Thus, even if lta results were completfily ^
the sa„ple, they would be representative of a significant portion
of clinical psychology professors.
Finally, it should be remembered that the effect size produced
by the experimental manipulations were slightly less than medium
in size, accounting for about seven percent of the variance.
At first glance it might even appear that this effect accounts
for so trivial a portion of the variance as to be quite unimportant.
However, there are at least two reasons for not adopting that con-
clusion. First, the experimental manipulation was intentionally
quite subtle. Though putting the applicant's religious orientation
in the context of a conversion may have increased its attention-
getting power, the applicant's religious orientation was essentially
a small bit of information embedded in a much larger application.
In fact, the dramatic power of these results is that such a subtle
manipulation can have any effect at all. Secondly, admission to
graduate school in clinical psychology is so extraordinarily
competitive that often an admissions committee must chose five
applicants out of five hundred. Admissions committee members from
various programs have told the author that choosing between
candidates in the final pool is a very difficult task. They find
that they must carefully scrutinize applicants for minor differences
with which to distinguish between them. In this context "trivial
factors" take on large proportions and can mean the difference
between acceptance and rejection. Thus, while the data suggest
that the bias against fundamentalists is not overwhelming, it is
not unimportant either.
In contrast to the preceding discussion of how generalizable
these findings are, it is also unclear how specific they are to
fundamentalists. Future research may discover that membership in
any group which is perceived by psychologists as extreme or deviant
hurts an applicants chances of admission. In the pilot study for
this project, psychologists were asked to rate what effect member-
ship in a variety of groups would have on their probability of
admitting an applicant. while subjects were reluctant to admit
that they would be influenced by any group affiliation, they did
clearly draw the line at extreme left- and right-wing political
groups such as the Klu-Klux-Klan and Red Brigade and religious
cults such as the Unification Church. While these groups are
clearly more extreme than fundamentalists, all groups may fall on
a continuum of extremism and/or deviance in the minds of psycho-
logists, with groups becoming increasingly less acceptable the
closer they fall to the end-points. Additionally, future research
might investigate whether right-wing groups are perceived by
psychologists as more deviant than left-wing groups.
Hypothesis 2 : "A fundamentalist Christian applicant who wishes
to integrate his practice of psychology with his religious orienta-
tion will be perceived more negatively, and will be less likely to
be admitted than both an identical applicant who has no known
religious orientation and one who is simply « fundamentalist."
Essentially, little support was found for this hypothesis.
While the fundamentalist applicant combining religion and psych-
ology did do worse on all variables than the control, he was not
rated significantly lower than the applicant who was simply a
fundamentalist. Results were, however, consistently in the expected
direction with the Fundamentalist being rated higher than the
Integrationist on "good feelings," "doubts" and "probability of
admission.
"
The experimental manipulation which distinguished the Funda-
mentalist and Integrationist applicants may simply have been too
subtle. A second possibility is that subjects already anticipate
that the fundamentalist's Christian faith will influence his work,
and thus are only mildly affected to hear him state it openly. In
either case, as implied earlier, further research needs to be done
on the factors which influence psychologists' perceptions of
traditionally religious people.
Hypothesis 3 ; "A variety of demographic and personal factors
will affect how strongly subjects respond to the applicant's
fundamentalist orientation."
Hypothesis 3a : "Subjects who are themselves more religious
may respond more positively to the fundamentalist applicants than
those who are less religious."
No formal support was found for this hypothesis. The absence
of both a significant main effect for religiosity and a significant
religiosity by group interaction suggests that the religiosity of
the rater is not a salient variable in this phenomenon. Perhaps
this is because one can be religious in so many different contexts.
The differences between a fundamentalist Christian and, for example,
a religious Unitarian are almost as great as those between a funda-
mentalist and an atheist. The effect of specific religious and
nonreligious beliefs held by the subject on biases against fundamen-
talists, should be assessed in future research.
Hypothesis 3b; "The subjects own religion may affect subjects
perception of the applicant. Specifically, in light of troubled
Jewish-Christian relations over the centuries, Jews may react more
negatively to the fundamentalist applicants than Gentiles."
When groups were divided into Jew and Gentile, a significant
religion by group interaction was obtained on probability of
admission, and one bordering on significance was found on need to
interview (see Figures 5 and 6). The most ready explanation for
the data is that the experimental hypothesis was correct; Jews
react more negatively to fundamentalists than Gentiles. Jews are
significantly more likely to want to interview the Integrationist
than Gentiles, and their probability of admitting the Fundamentalist
is significantly lower than their probability of admitting the
Control which is not true for Gentiles.
In historical perspective, such a conclusion would not be sur-
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prising. Of course, fundamentalist Christians are simply differ-
ent fro, Jews. Cultural, ethnic and religious groups who are
different always invite prejudice. More centrally, however, Jews
have faced centuries of persecution at the hands of Christians.
Indeed, the most zealous believers have often been the most cruel
(Blum, Cameron & Barnes, 1970), with the Crusades and Inquisition
being among the most notable examples. Thus, one would be surprised
not to discover among Jews an extra degree of apprehension of
fervent traditional Christians.
The fact that only Jews were significantly less likely to
accept the Fundamentalist in comparison to the Control might raise
the question "Is religious discrimination against fundamentalist
Christians in clinical psychology predominantly a Jewish phenomenon?"
Other findings mitigate against such a suggestion. Gentiles show
significantly less good feelings and more doubts about the Funda-
mentalist and Integrationist applicants as compared to the Control.
They have greater need to interview the Fundamentalist as compared
to the Control. They are significantly less likely to admit the
Integrationist than they are the Control. Finally, even though
the difference was not significant, Gentiles did rate the Funda-
mentalist as less likely to be accepted than the Control.
Some additional confusion is caused by the source of the
religion by group interaction. Examination of Figure 6 reveals
that Jews and Gentiles report an equal probability of admitting
the Fundamentalist and Integrationist applicants. Their greatest
difference comes tn their rating of the Control. A nore de£lnltlve
and classic interaction would find Jews and Gentiles eqoal on the
control applicant and different on the experimental ones. A
variety of explanations might accoont for this. The applicant may
begin as more attractive to Jews, or Jews may begin as generally
more generons admissions officers, before the effect of funda-
mentalist belief eliminated whatever advantage the applicant had
with Jewish professors.
In either case, the fact that most of the variation between
Jews and Gentiles is in their rating of the control applicant must
make our conclusions about the effect of religion on psychology
professor's response to fundamentalist applicants tentative. In
addition, the same factors which cause us to limit the generaliz-
ability of our findings with respect to hypothesis 1 are relevant
to this hypothesis as well. Future research into this area is
recommended
.
Hypothesis 3c: "The subject's geographic region of origin
and current residence may affect their response to the applicant.
Specifically, subjects from the South and Midwest, may react more
positively to the fundamentalist than Northeasterners, and
Westerners.
"
No support was found for this hypothesis. No significant
group differences were obtained among subjects originating from or
residing in different national regions. Similar findings were
obtained when the analysis was repeated combining the groups into
far Westerner and Northeasterner vs. Southerner and Midwesterner,
or when rearranging the, into Northeasterner vs. non-Northeasterner
In addition, it was anticipated that "The subject's age, sex,
race, psychological orientation and the size of the program where'
they teach may exert some unpredicted influence on subject's
response to the applicant."
Older subjects were kinder in their evaluations of all three
applicants than younger professors. There was however, no signi-
ficant age by group interaction, indicating that older and younger
subjects were not affected differently by the religious affiliation
of the applicants. No other significant findings were obtained.
Summary and Conclusions
Anti-traditional religious statements abound in the psycho-
logical literature, and there are increasing reports of religious
discrimination against born-again Christians in psychology. Yet,
until now, no substantive empirical research has been done on this
purported bias.
Results clearly support the hypothesis that professors of
clinical psychology are biased against applicants who profess to
be fundamentalist Christians. Additional evidence tentatively
suggests that this bias may be stronger among Jews than Gentiles.
An expressed intention to integrate fundamentalist Christianity
and psychology was surprisingly, not found to reduce one's chances
of admission as compared to an applicant who is s^ply a fundaraen.
talist, perhaps because professors assume that any fundamentalist's
religious views would affect their work. The generalizability of
these findings are somewhat limited by the fact that this is a
"first study" in an area that needs much more research.
The 80»s are proving to be a time of rapid growth for the field
of Christian psychology, with new counseling centers, journals and
graduate schools going up almost overnight. With that are coming
an eager new generation of Christians considering graduate study
in psychology. How will graduate programs deal with these indivi-
duals?
The 80' s are also proving to be a decade of radical confron-
tation between conservative Christians groups and the liberal world,
of which psychology is clearly a part. If psychology cannot adapt,
and integrate students, faculty and ideas from the conservative
Christian world, it may soon find itself on the "hit list" of groups
like the Moral Majority. The issue of how extensively to fund psych-
ology will cease to be only an economic and political one, but may
become a religious battle as well, with religious taxpayers saying
they no more wish to fund an "atheistic psychology" than they do
abortion
.
The portent of such an apocolyptic battle could easily
distract us however, from the more insidious and devastating
effects of religious discrimination in psychology. The most
obvious of these is the negative professional and psychological
i^act it has on those individuals who are discriminated against.
Less apparent, but more virulent is the effect it has on the
Evangelical Christian community as a whole.
Varying reports estimate that Born-Again Christians comprise
between ten and thirty percent of the American population. I„ a
recent study, King (1978) reports that a substantial proportion
of those people suffer from psychological problems, yet an over-
whelming majority are suspicious or completely unwilling to see
secular therapists. In addition, King reports that most of his
subjects would strongly like to have better quality Christian
mental health care in their area. Thus, the urgent need for more
well trained Evangelical Christian mental health professionals is
clear. In fact, Evangelical Christians may represent one of the
most underserved populations with regard to mental health services
in the United States. Thus, any policies which restrict Conser-
vative Christian's access to graduate education in psychology
only contribute to this serious social problem.
I believe that psychology will, indeed already has begun to
adapt to traditional religion. The fact that this thesis could be
written is an indication of that. However, much more needs to be
done to understand and remove the religious prejudice that still
abides in psychology.
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April 15, 1981
Dear Colleague:
As Clinical Advisor to John Gartner, one of our advancedgraduate students, I have the pleasant duty of being on his thesiscommittee. John is involved in exploring some of the variables"Eat
I finTbotf
admiSSlr ln CllniCal Oology, a topic that1 r nd th interesting and important.
Where you come in is that his questionnaire is enclosed
Although we both know that your schedule is very tight, both John
and I would appreciate it if you would take the time to fill out
the questionnaire.
Sincerely,
David M. Todd, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Psychology
and Director of Clinical Training
DMT/jmb
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Dear Professor:
With the advent of psychotherapy outcome and process researchhas come a great deal of interest in what makes a good clinicalpsychologist. Yet, very little research has been done on tne factors
the relative importance that ^.^L^-^^S^"
SiSoSlS.:^ ~ade-C when making^
In the next few pages, you will read what is a simulated appli-cation from a hypothetical applicant to your program. While readingit please imagine that all the spaces in your next year's class havebeen filled except one, for which you have 10 other qualified applil
cants. After reading it, I would like you to answer a few questionsconcerning your response to this applicant. Afterward, there is abrief, optional questionnaire with a few anonymous questions concern-ing yourself.
I am obliged to tell you that by filling out this questionnaire
you indicate your willingness to participate in this study. However,
please bear in mind that your answers are completely anonymous, and
thus confidentiality is assured. If you would like to see the results
of this study, either put your name and address at the bottom of this
page, or send me a note at the address below. Please also feel free
to contact me if you have any questions or problems concerning this
project:
John Gartner
Department of Psychology
539 Tobin Hall
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA 01003
Thank you in advance for taking your valuable and probably
scarce time to help me in my research and graduate study.
Sincerely,
John Gartner
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Statistical Inf orm* t-i™
Name: Paul Madden
Age : 24
Marital Status: Single
College: Wesleyan
Expected Graduation: 5/81
Major: Psychology Race: White
Overall GPA: 3.5
Psych GPA: 3.65
GRE: V 670 M 610 A 620
Psych GRE: 650
Recommendations: Very good-excellent
Personal Statement
My home was and is, a world of extremes. My parents are con-siderate intelligent, and highly controlled people. My youngerbrother is an often uncontrolled and florid schizophrenic Forme this polarity defined reality for quite a long time. As anold joke goes, there are two types of people in the world. I chosethe former type, making good grades, becoming known as unusually
responsible and quietly fearing that ray crisp, neat order might
some day fall apart.
During adolescence, I found it increasingly hard to accept
that order, and like many of my friends became mildly rebellious
and introspective.
I entered Wesleyan the fall after my senior year, largely
because they offered me a full scholarship, but dropped out
against parental advice, after one year. I went to Mecca of youth
culture, Boston, where I supported myself as a typist, discovered
marijuana, read a variety of books from Hegel to Huey Newton, and
formed my first long-term relationship.
I was very happy during most of ray stay in Boston, but after
2 years, the charm of bohemianism began to fade. I had affirmed
my right to feel and to "be," but began wondering what I would do
with the next 50 years. At first I wondered if this was the impulse
to "sell out," like the SDS men who went on to law school, but I
began to realize that my intellect and drive were as integral a
part of me as I had now accepted my emotions to be, and I would
only be happy using both. It was at this time that I began con-
sidering Psychology.
Applicant 2 and 3
It was also at this time that I became interested in Christi-
anity. In the person and teachings of Christ, I saw a perfect
synthesis of the qualities I was trying to integrate, justice/reason
and love/emotion. Partially as a result of this, and partially as
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threatened me most, schizophrenics. The first week, old memoriesand fears were so strong that every dav T wantoH i-«
out of the building. I^ill always b^Su 'f ^pp^my supervisor Dr Harry Schumworth, at this time. I don 'know
L ^ C °?P letely conquered the sense of eeriness 1 felt workin,with schizophrenics, but I learned to face it, and them as realpeople. Under Dr. Schumworth, I helped administer a token economyfor the patients on Ward 7 for the summer. In October I was nuton the paid full-time staff. In collaboration with and under the
supervision of Dr. Schumworth, I designed and implemented a newtoken economy system on two other wards. I functioned as supervisorto several nurses, aides, and volunteers. I also served as a
research assistant on a project investigating the relative effective
ness of a variety of secondary reinforcements. The results werepresented at the meeting of the Association of Behaviour Analysis
and I received an acknowledgement.
I left the V.A., with a sense of excitement about clinical
work and research, and re-enrolled at Wesleyan, this time as a
Psychology major, and this time with a great deal more enthusiasm
and confidence. I joined the Wesleyan Peer Counselors Organization,
and became its vice-president my senior year. I found that working'
with YAVIS clients had its own challenges. Unlike the ward, I held
no rewards or punishments for my clients. I had to learn to
motivate them in other ways, really use their own motivation to
avoid punishment and find reward in their own lives. Some things
were constant, however. Though it was emphasized more explicitly
In peer counseling, T. had learned from my experience on the ward
that unless the patient feels in some way accepted and understood
as an individual, he will fight treatment rather than work with
it.
As my transcript indicates, I took just about every psychology
course Wesleyan had to offer. I was especially influenced by an
advanced seminar in psychoanalysis, taught by Professor John Klecker,
from whom I later took a reading course on psychoanalytic theories
of severe psychopathology
.
A shorter version of the paper written
for that reading course, entitled "Trends in modern psychoanalytic
thinking on psychosis," was presented at the 1979 meeting of the
Wesleyan Undergraduate Research Conference in Psychology.
After doing that paper, I became interested In psychotherapy
outcome studies evaluating the differential effectiveness of psycho-
dynamic psychotherapy and behaviour modification with schizophrenic
patients. My senior thesis attempts to empirically discover if
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^^e^^ already cited in the
either treatment J£l£*£T* £^11^^ "FT °'supervision of Dr. Schumworth and Dr! Klecter I Hp i ,checklist concerning various patient Ittt t I develo Ped a 25-pt.
its results with outcome data ni .
UteS
'
and co"elated
Applicant 3
P&ycnoj.ogist. I see them as intimately linked TaTTi t i q t
graduate school, and after graduation I ho^S int^ri^ the"clinical skxlls I learn with my Christian beliefs in the work I dowith clients I also hope to do research on issues related toChristian belief and psychology.
In graduate school I also hope to continue my research andclinical work wxth severe psychopathology. After careful study ofthe psychological orientations and research interests of yourfaculty, I say strongly that your institution would be an excellentplace for me to do that. 1
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1
Extremely
good
Strongly Moderately Slightly"
9°od good ' good
2.
Hot
good
Given the information you have to what PY tont l
this app,Ws potenlu, t0^° fgLd XcHn ( c°, y^yctlo;???5 tS " ab°"
1
Extreme
doubt
Strong
doubt
Moderate
doubt
Slight
doubt
No
doubt
1
3
- ssrs E* •s^s'sr; : n your ««" * »*«
Extremely
less
important
St
r
on[ily Moder
-
STTgFtly Averaqe Sliohtlv R^C? c-
8
i
=—9
less less iL J in 9n iy Moder. Strongly Extremely^^ ssr. ta- nt c£,t c&. csJ
i
Definitely Strongly Moder. bhgntiy Equally STiJtT7
would not unlikely unlikely unlikely likely/ likely
unlikely
8
Moder. Strongly Definitely
likely likely would
Finally, could you give us some basic information about yourself.
?o ySu/
0110^" 9 SCa1e, Ple3Se lnd1Cate h0W imP°rtant the following are
1
Vitally
important
Money
Culture
Strongly Moderately SI ightly
important important important
_Family
Clinical work
^Religion
Teaching
6, Demographic information:
Sex Age # of years since Ph.D. Race
State now residing State or nation of origin
Religion Psychological orientation
of students in your clinical program
Have you ever been involved with graduate admissions?
Comments on this questionnaire
Not
important
Politics
Research
(Use back if needed)
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